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I. INTRODUCTION
A primary component of contemporary increases in electricity
rates1 is the dramatic inflation in capital costs associated with new
generation.2 Many factors have served to fuel this surge,3 including
new federally mandated pollution control equipment 4 coupled with
* B.A., Iowa State University, 1975; J.D., University of Florida, 1981. General
Counsel, Community Action Research Group, Inc., Ames, Iowa. CARG is a re-
search and consulting firm that specializes in public utility regulation.
1. See, e-g., Sheehan, Policy Options for Dealing with the Impact of Continuing En-
ergy Price Increases on the Iowa Economy, IoWA LEGIS. EXTENDED ASSISTANCE
GROUP REP. (1982).
2. See generally C. KOMANOFF, POWER PLANT COST ESCALATION (1981).
3. C. KOMANOFF, supra note 2, at 235.
4. Id. at 2-3.
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rapidly escalating interest rates.5 Indeed, the "shock" associated with
placing newly completed generating capacity into a utility's rate base
has caused substantial recent regulatory concern.6
One mechanism frequently proposed to combat increasing electric
rates is the development and implementation of "full energy serv-
ices." 7 These services include utility participation in the provision of
such things as energy conservation, load management, and renewable
resource devices.8 Proponents of these services assert that the meas-
ures can provide the same end energy results to consumers at a lesser
cost than conventional power sources. 9
Increasingly, legislative and administrative decisionmakers are rec-
ognizing the importance of this ability to "substitute" among energy
services. For example, in 1977 the Oregon legislature approved a stat-
ute which provided that:
(3) Insulation and other weatherization measures in many cases can con-
serve energy and make it available for other uses at less cost than energy
from new sources.
(4) Expenditures by energy suppliers on conservation programs is in many
cases a prudent and cost-effective means of gaining new supplies for en-
ergy consumers. 1 0
Similarly, the New York legislature enacted a program that provides
for utility financing of energy conservation measures. That legislation
stated in relevant part that the program would benefit "all energy
users and consumers in this state since the demand for highly priced
incremental sources of energy will be reduced."1' The legislature
noted that "savings to homeowners would be in terms of millions of
dollars per year; jobs would be created; and energy supplies would be
saved for wiser use."12
State utility regulators are also beginning to pursue the concept of
5. Komanoff found that "the contribution of [interest during construction] to plant
cost rose by about 40 percent from 1971 to 1978 and is projected to double overall
from 1971 to 1988. C. KoMANOFF, supra note 2, at 245. For coal fired plants, the
interest during construction share of total costs increased from 5.9 percent to a
projected 10.4 percent from 1971 to 1988. Komanoff concluded, however, that
when costs were viewed in real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) terms, the "increases in
IDC account for only a small fraction of real past and projected future increases
in nuclear and coal costs." Id.
6. Masella, Rate Moderation Plans-Cushioning "Rate Shock", PuB. UTiL. FORT.,
Feb. 16, 1984, at 52.
7. See, e.g., Schroeder & Miller, The Validity of Utility Conservation Programs Ac-
cording To Generally Accepted Regulatory Principles, 3 SOLAR L. REP. 967 (1982).
8. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 476A.6 (Supp. 1984).
9. See, e.g., Act of July 28, 1977, ch. 889, § 2(3)-(4), 1977 Or. Laws 1049 [hereinafter
cited as Act of July 28]. See also In re Class A Gas Util. Residential Insulation
Program, No. 05-GV-2 (Wis. P.S.C. Sept. 22, 1977).
10. Act of July 28, supra note 9. See also infra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
11. Act of Aug. 11, 1977, ch. 858, § 1(7), 1977 N.Y. Laws 1.
12. Id. at § 1(5).
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full energy services. The Idaho Public Service Commission approved a
utility financed residential energy conservation program that included
zero interest loans. The Commission stated that: "[t]he rationale for
the zero interest loan offer is quite simple. The cost of new generating
plants and transmission lines has now become so high that it is
cheaper for Idaho utilities to augment existing electricity supplies by
financing efficiency improvements instead of new plant invest-
ment."13 Other state utility regulatory commissions, making like find-
ings, have ordered similar conservation financing programs.14
Moreover, many public and private utility companies have initiated
finance programs on their own.15
In the past several years, the primary controversy regarding util-
ity-financed energy conservation programs has been over whether
companies could be directed to provide such programs against their
will. In Iowa, the supreme court sustained an industry challenge to
mandatory conservation financing by saying that such a program was
beyond the "traditional" realm of utility regulation and utility ser-
vice.16 The court held that it was beyond the statutory authority of
the state utility commission to adopt mandatory utility financing with-
out legislative approval of such a program.17
The District of Columbia Public Service Commission similarly dis-
approved an involuntary utility financing program.'s The Commis-
sion held that financing was not "essential" to the provision of
electricity and natural gas, and that the authority to require such util-
ity activity was not inherent in the broad grant of power to "regulate
the rates and services" of utility companies.' 9
In spite of this historical opposition to financing programs, industry
analysts are becoming progressively more attuned to the need to have
utilities provide services other than electricity and natural gas. Ana-
13. In re Washington Water Power Co., UTiL. L. REP. (CCH) 23,191.01 (Idaho
P.U.C. Sept. 26, 1980).
14. See, e.g., Re. Detroit Edison Co., No. U-6871 (Mich. P.S.C. June 29, 1982); In re
Duke Power Co., 26 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 241, 273 (N.C. P.U.C. Aug. 31, 1978).
15. See generally Geller, Say Good-by to Electricity Guzzlers, PuB. PoWER, July/Aug.,
1983, at 42; Wayne, Demand Planning in the 80's, E.P.R.I. JoURNAL, Dec. 1984, at
6. A 1983 U.S. G.A.O. study reported that 208 of the 908 members of the National
Regulatory Electric Cooperative Association have energy conservation loan pro-
grams. The investor-owned utilities were not quite as prolific. The G.A.O. study
noted that 15 of the 190 members of the Edison Electric Institute sponsored con-
servation financing programs. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STATUS OF
VARIous ELEcTRIc ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAMS, ACTIVITIES, AND PowER-
PLANT CAPACITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, Sept. 19, 1983, at 19.
16. Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 748
(Iowa 1983).
17. Id. at 753.
18. Re. Residential Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, 48 PuB. UTIL. REP.
(PUR) 575 (D.C. P.S.C. July 16, 1982).
19. Id. at 583-85.
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lysts are now saying that the promotion of energy conservation and
small power production would provide the utility industry with in-
creased flexibility in the commitment of capital during times of high
interest rates and uncertain demand.20 In addition, the dollar commit-
ments to these types of full energy services would place a lesser bur-
den on a financially strapped industry.2 1 The industry is increasingly
beginning to realize that the benefits of utility involvement in non-
traditional energy services are high while the costs are low. 22
While the move toward utility participation in energy conservation
financing gains momentum throughout the country, however, a new
problem has arisen for publicly-owned utilities. Even for those com-
panies that are willing to provide financing programs, some concern
has arisen over whether public power entities have the same flexibil-
ity to offer such programs as do investor-owned companies.23 For ex-
ample, legal counsel for the Lincoln (Nebraska) Electric System
(LES) informed that utility:
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Lincoln Electric Sys-
tem, City of Lincoln, to develop and implement a scheme of financing for
making loans to its customers which would not be violative of... constitu-
tional mandate .... [T]he Nebraska Consitution clearly forbids the Lincoln
Electric System ... from extending any credit to its customers for the
purchase of energy conservation measures. 2 4
The issue is raised by state constitutional restrictions on the use of
public credit.25 For example, the Nebraska Constitution provides that
"[t]he credit of the state shall never be given or loaned in aid of any
20. Sawhill & Silverman, Build Flexibility-Not Power Plants, PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
May 26, 1983, at 17.
21. See White, Solar Investments by a Municipal Utility, 55 N.D.L. REV. 409 (1979).
22. Lawrence & Minan, Financing Solar Energy Development through Public Utili-
ties, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 371, 406 (1982).
23. The issue to which this Article is directed thus regards whether a public power
entity, such as a municipal utility or a public power district that desires to offer
energy conservation financing, has the constitutional authority to do so in light of
restrictions on lending the state's credit. The issue, in this respect, differs from
that situation involving a state regulatory body compelling a public utility to pro-
vide financing against its will.
24. Letter from Larry V. Albers to Walt Canney (Aug. 14, 1979). See also State of
Wash. 1978 Op. Att'y Gen. No. 13. The legal conclusion reached in the attorney
general's opinion was that the Washington state constitution:
[p]rohibit[s] a city or public utility district from assisting its utility cus-
tomers, generally, in the purchase of such conservation materials as in-
sulation or storm windows from private suppliers by providing to the
seller a guarantee of payment of part or all of the agreed upon purchase
price for the conservation materials involved.
Id. at 1.
25. For a complete listing of the state constitutional provisions, see B. GRENIER & R.
COLTON, UTILITY CONSERVATION FINANCING PROGRAMS FOR NEBRASKA'S PUB-
LICLY-OWNED UTILITIES: LEGAL ISSUES AND CONSIDERATIONS 87-137 (Neb. En-
ergy Office Rep.) (July 14, 1984) [hereinafter cited as GRENIER & COLTON].
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individual, association or corporation ... ,"26 Similar provisions ex-
ist in the constitutions of forty-seven states.2 7 The treatment of the
constitutional proscription by the Nebraska Supreme Court clearly in-
dicates the problems that such provisions might raise for financing
programs offered by publicly-owned electric utilities. In State ex rel.
Beck v. City of York,28 the court said that "[t]he prohibition clearly
provides that the credit of the state may not be given or loaned to an
individual, association or corporation under any circumstances." 29
The court further held that the prohibition extended to all political
subdivisions of the state,30 and that it encompassed revenue bonds as
well as general obligation bonds.31
The purpose of this Article is to examine this constitutional pro-
scription on lending the credit of the state as it applies to energy con-
servation financing programs offered by publicly-owned electric
utilities. Since all electric utilities in Nebraska are publicly-owned, as
required by state law,32 the Article will use the Nebraska constitu-
tional provisions as the basis for analysis. Appropriate comparisons
and contrasts to other state consitutional provisions will be noted
throughout the Article. To the extent that constitutional restrictions
may prevent municipal utility loans to electric customers, utility fi-
nancing of energy conservation measures may be limited to the inves-
tor-owned utilities (IOUs).
The tenor of the constitutional provisions to be explored in this
Article is to prohibit the lending of a state's credit to any individual,
association, or corporation. The extent to which such constitutional
limitations prohibit energy conservation financing by publicly-owned
utilities is to be determined through an examination of the language of
the proscription. The constitutional provision establishes three ele-
ments that are essential to establish its applicability. First, there must
be "credit" involved. Second, the credit must be that "of the state."
Third, the credit must be "given or loaned." Each of these constitu-
tional issues will be examined in depth. First, however, it is necessary
to gain a historical perspective on the constitutional provision so as to
ascertain the policies to be promoted through its application.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CREDIT RESTRICTIONS
As the United States expanded rapidly to the West during the
1800s, one of the major undertakings was to provide for a new infra-
26. NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 3.
27. See GRENIER & COLTON, supra note 25.
28. 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
29. Id. at 226, 82 N.W.2d at 272.
30. Id. at 225, 82 N.W.2d at 271.
31. Id. at 227, 82 N.W.2d at 272.
32. GRENmR & COLTON, supra note 25, at 3-4.
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structure that included transportation and communication facilities.
State and local governments, to promote this development, and to as-
sure that development occurred in their areas, offered significant fi-
nancial inducements. These inducements came in the form of
government granted loans, the issuance of bonds, and the guarantee of
credit.33 The magnitude of this public investment was substantial.
The New Mexico Supreme Court later spoke of the "mania for ex-
tending public aid to private corporations,"3 4 while the Arizona
Supreme Court referred to the "orgies of extravagant dissipation of
public funds."35
The grant of public funds to assist in the construction and provision
of such facilities led to acute financial difficulties beginning in the
1830s. An economic depression swept the United States during these
years, which resulted in the bankruptcies of several railroads and the
subsequent defaults on debts secured by the states.36 The prior com-
mitment of funds led many states to the verge of bankruptcy them-
selves.37 An example of this phenomenon occurred in New York. In
1840, to encourage the construction of the Long Island Railroad, the
New York legislature enacted a statute authorizing the railroad to sell
certificates that would be insured by the state and reimbursable at its
pleasure any time after the expiration of twenty years. In 1858, the
New York legislature fixed a payment date fifteen years after the ex-
piration of the first twenty years. The validity of this extension of the
obligation was brought before the New York Court of Appeals.38 The
court found that the 1858 action of the legislature was valid, thereby
forcing the holders of the certificates to wait a total of thirty-five years
for redemption. The action of the legislature, while unpopular with
33. Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 334, 438 P.2d 725, 727 (1968). See gener-
ally Comment, State Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting the Loaning of
Credit to Private Enterprise-A Suggested Analysis, 41 U. COLO. L. REv. 135, 136
(1969); Comment, State Constitutional Limitations on a Municipality's Power to
Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals and Associations, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 95, 97 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Comment, State Constitutional
Limitations].
34. City of Clovis v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 49 N.M. 270, 276, 161 P.2d 878, 882
(1945) (quoting Murphy v. Dever, 320 Ill. 186, 188-89, 150 N.E. 663, 663-64 (1926)).
35. City of Tempe v. Pilot Properties, Inc., 22 Ariz. App. 356, 360, 527 P.2d 515, 519
(1974) (quoting Thaanum v. Bynum Irr. Dist., 72 Mont. 221, 227, 232 P. 528, 530,
(1925)). One commentator quantified the extent of this financial commitment.
He noted that Kentucky counties and towns incurred a debt of $13 million to
assist railroad construction; 86 counties in Illinois provided a railroad subsidy of
over $16 million; and municipalities in Kansas contributed over $12 million to the
railroad industry. See Comment, State Constitutional Limitations, supra note 33,
at 97.
36. Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 334, 438 P.2d 725, 727 (1968).
37. Maryland Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Helfrich, 250 Md. 602, 605, 243 A.2d 869, 870
(1968).
38. People ex rel De Forest v. Denniston, 23 N.Y. 247 (1861).
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the holders of the certificates, was probably an effort to avoid an out
and out default that would have required the taxpayers to come to the
rescue.
39
As a result of these financial debacles of the 1800s, nearly every
state adopted constitutional proscriptions on the lending of the credit
of the state to private enterprise. According to the New Mexico
Supreme Court, the "essence" of these constitutional provisions "was
to restrict the activities and functions of the state, county, and munici-
pality to that of government, and forbid their engaging directly or in-
directly in commercial enterprises for profit."40 These constitutional
provisions were designed to protect the state treasury, and the state
taxpayers, against losses resulting from the failure of such a private
undertaking guaranteed by the state.41
Thus, in examining the lawfulness of a conservation financing pro-
gram to be offered by a publicly-owned utility, it is necessary to deter-
mine whether such a program would bring about any liability of the
citizens for the levy of some tax, or whether such a program would
impose a financial burden upon the citizens of the community that
owns the utility. It is to these issues that this Article will be directed.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Energy conservation financing programs, when undertaken by
publicly-owned entities such as a municipal utility, raise possible con-
stitutional problems. A recent exploration of the issue for the Ne-
braska Energy Office found that forty-seven states had some type of
constitutional restriction on the lending of the credit of the state to
private entities.42 Concern has been raised that these provisions serve'
to bar the pursuit of financing programs. In states where public own-
ership is common, the constitutional bar, if it exists, could raise serious
barriers to a utility move toward the provision of full energy services.
Three elements must be present for the constitutional proscription
to be applicable. There must be "credit" involved; the credit must be
39. Maryland Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Helfrich, 250 Md. 602, 605, 243 A.2d 869, 870
(1968).
40. City of Clovis v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 49 N.M. 270, 276-77, 161 P.2d 878,
882 (1945) (quoting Bailey v. City of Tampa, 92 Fla. 1030, 1035, 111 So. 119, 120
(1926).
41. See also supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Historically, the constitutional
prohibition on lending the credit of the state sought only to bar the state acting as
a surety for private industry: "Manifestly, the only purpose of this provision is to
prohibit the state from acting as a surety or guarantor of the collateral obligation
of another party." State ex rel Thomson v. Giessel, 271 Wis. 15, 29, 72 N.W.2d 577,.
584 (1955). See generally Grout v. Kendall, 195 Iowa 467, 192 N.W. 529 (1923);
State ex rel O'Connell v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 2 Wash. App. 366, 469 P.2d 922
(1970).
42. GRENIER & COLTON, supra note 25, at 87-137.
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that "of the state"; and the credit must have been "given or loaned."
Each of these elements will be examined in depth below.
A. Does a Conservation Financing Program Involve the Public "Credit"?
The determination of whether public "credit" is involved with an
energy conservation financing program is to be made based on a multi-
level inquiry. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Beck v.
City of York,43 addressed in some detail the circumstances under
which public "credit" would be found to be implicated in a financing
program. The court held:
The issuance of the bonds in the name of the city for the payment of the cost
of the project evidences the fact that the credit of the city has been extended.
The city is the payer of the bonds and it is primarily liable for their payment.
The bonds become the obligations of the city .... A failure of payment is a
default by the city.
4 4
Several indices thus guide whether public credit has been extended.45
First, there must be some evidence of indebtedness incurred on the
part of the public body. Generally issued in the form of revenue
bonds,46 those bonds "are issued by the city in its own name to give
them a marketability and value which they would otherwise not pos-
sess."47 Second, the indebtedness must be a legal obligation of the city
whereby the city is held to be a payer of the indebtedness. Use of the
city as such a payer "is intended to given respectability to [the bonds]
because of the general acceptability of cities as a source of bond issues
in financial markets." 48
43. 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
44. Id. at 226, 82 N.W.2d at 272.
45. See City of Clovis v. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 49 N.M. 270, 282, 161 P.2d 878,
885 (1945).
46. See, e.g., Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 336, 438 P.2d 725, 728 (1968),
where the court said, with respect to the revenue bond method of financing
Constitutional provisions like those of §§ 7 and 9 [proscriptions on lend-
ing the credit of the state], Art. XI, supra, have been construed with few
exceptions as no obstacle. Newberry v. City of Andalusia et al., 257 Ala.
40, 57 So. 2d 629 (1952); DeArmond v. Alaska State Development Corpo-
ration, 376 P.2d 717, 721 (Alaska 1962); Roan v. Connecticut Industrial
Building Commission, 150 Conn. 333, 189 A.2d 399, 404 (1963); Green v.
City of Mt. Pleasant, 256 Iowa 1184, 131 N.W.2d 5 (1964); Faulconer v.
City of Danville, 313 Ky. 468, 232 S.W.2d 80 (1950); Hebert v. Police Jury
of West Baton Rouge Parish, 200 So. 2d 877 (La. 1967); City of Gaylord v.
Beckett, 378 Mich. 273, 144 N.W.2d 460 (1966); Village of Deming v. Hos-
dreg Company, 62 N.M. 18, 303 P.2d 920 (1956); Holly v. City of
Elizabethton, 193 Tenn. 46, 241 S.W.2d 1001 (1951); Industrial Develop-
ment Authority of City of Cheasapeake v. Suthers, 208 Va. 51, 155 S.E.2d
326 (1967). Many more cases could be cited which hold.to the same
effect.
Id.
47. State ex rel Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 227, 82 N.W.2d 269, 272 (1957).
48. Id.
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The Nebraska courts, however, distinguish between the use of state
monies49 and the use of state credit.o The two words are not used
coterminously in Nebraska and the constitutional restrictions differ as
well. Public money cannot be spent unless it is for a "public pur-
pose."51 In contrast, the credit of the state "may not be given or
loaned" to private interests "under any circumstances." 52 The distinc-
tion between the use of public monies and public credit could be of
value in establishing the validity of an energy conservation financing
program. Such a program need not involve the elements of loaning
public credit. A program of financing funded through current operat-
ing funds, for example, would not invoke the prohibition on lending
the credit of the state.53 No debt is incurred, and no repayment obliga-
tion is imposed. Rather the cost of the program would be payable
from ongoing revenues. The Nebraska Supreme Court has directly
addressed the treatment of such "operating expenses" in light of that
state's constitutional financial restrictions. In United Community
Services v. Omaha National Bank,54 the court held that "[i]n this juris-
diction, under the general power granted public corporations, the rev-
enues derived are required to be devoted to the purposes for which the
corporation is being operated, that is, the payment of operating ex-
penses and improvements of the facilities."5 5 The Court held that
even charitable contributions by a municipal corporation could be con-
sidered "operating expenses" if they "bring some benefits to the
district."56
Clearly, this language still leaves a number of issues to be resolved
on a case-by-case basis before a conservation finance program could be
unequivocally approved. A public utility would need to establish that
49. "Our organic law prohibits the expenditure of public money for private purpose.
It does not matter whether the money is derived by ad valorem taxes, by gift, or
otherwise." Id. at 229, 82 N.W.2d at 273.
50. "When the State or a political subdivision thereof becomes a payor of a revenue
bond or any other evidence of indebtedness which is to be used in the accomplish-
ment of a private as distinguished from a public purpose, the credit of the State
has been given or loaned .... " Id. at 226-27, 82 N.W.2d at 272.
51. Id. at 229, 82 N.W.2d at 273.
52. Id. at 226, 82 N.W.2d at 272 (emphasis added). The Nebraska Supreme Court dis-
tinguishes between the public money and the public credit, stating: "The manu-
facturing of sugar and chicory is a private enterprise, and the public money or
credit cannot be given or loaned in aid of any individual, association, or corpora-
tion carrying on such enterprises." Id. at 230-31, 82 N.W.2d at 274 (emphasis ad-
ded) (quoting Oxnard Beet Sugar Co. v. State, on reh'g, 73 Neb. 66, 68, 105 N.W.
716, 717 (1905).
53. See State ex rel Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968).
54. 162 Neb. 786, 77 N.W.2d 576 (1956).
55. Id. at 794-95, 77 N.W.2d at 584. See also State ex rel Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb.
302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968).
56. United Community Servs. v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 162 Neb. 786,795,77 N.W.2d 576,
584 (1956).
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the provision of conservation, load management, and renewable re-
source devices is among the "purposes for which the corporation is
being operated."5 7 In contrast, the utility could seek to establish that
the implementation of such nontraditional energy measures would in-
volve the "improvement of the [utility's] facilities."5 8 In either case, to
the extent that an energy conservation financing program could be
funded out of current operating revenues, no debt would need to be
incurred and no constitutional restrictions would apply.
Mechanisms exist to fund such a financing program out of current
operating revenues. For example, a simple surcharge placed on cur-
rent rates could raise the additional necessary capital in a way which,
in the long-term, would minimize rates to consumers.5 9 Such a
surcharge, used to finance alternatives to central station capacity ex-
pansion, might easily be justified on economic grounds.60 So long as
the present value of the marginal cost of central station capacity ex-
ceeded the magnitude of the surcharge, ratepayers would receive fi-
nancial and economic benefits from the conservation program.61 In
any event, no constitutional barrier would exist to the pursuit of such
an endeavor.
Not all state courts would require their publicly-owned utilities to
go to such efforts to avoid incurring public "credit" as contemplated by
constitutional restrictions. While not unique in its construction of the
term "credit," 62 the Nebraska courts are clearly part of minority opin-
ion in holding that the issuance of revenue bonds constitutes lending
the credit of the state.63 Most state courts have held that revenue fi-
nancing "kept inviolate the general taxation."64 Moreover, substantial
57. Id. at 794-95, 77 N.W.2d at 584.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., M. Sheehan, Designing Electric Rates to Conserve Community Re-
sources, Enhance Local Productivity and Stem the Outward Flow of Energy Dol-
lars: The OSL Rate Design Proposal, (Oct. 1984) (paper presented at the National
Colloquium on Community Energy Management as an Economic Development
Strategy, Lincoln, Neb.).
60. Sheehan, supra note 59.
61. Reducing the level of demand saves two critical resources:
money and time. It saves money in three ways: it saves operating costs
in the short term (efficiency costs less than fuel plus O&M plus grid
losses); it saves construction costs in the medium term; and it saves re-
placement costs in the long terms. All three savings decrease the pres-
ent value of revenue requirements. Reducing demand also stretches
operating reserves and operating lifetimes, postponing capacity decisions
as long as possible so that more information will be available.
Address by Amory Lovins, "Saving Gigabucks with Negawatts," 96th Annual
Convention, Nat'l Assoc. of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs, Nov. 26, 1984, at 8 (em-
phasis in original).
62. See State v. Clay County Dev. Auth., 140 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1962); Village of Moyie
Springs, Idaho v. Aurora Mfg. Co., 82 Idaho 337, 353 P.2d 767 (1960).
63. See supra note 46.
64. Carruthers v. Port of Astoria, 249 Or. 329, 335, 438 P.2d 725, 728 (1968).
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political incentives have existed recently, pushing the states toward
approval of this type of financing. In 1968 the Oregon Supreme Court
noted:
Heavy federal income taxes, coupled with the exemption already noted for
the income from municipal securities, supplied a substantial incentive for in-
dustry to try to finance by this method. State after state has authorized one or
more classes of its municipalities to offer this financing method to private in-
dustries .... 65
Two states, in particular, have approved the issuance of revenue
bonds as a means of financing by publicly-owned electric utilities. 6 6 In
Kentucky, the court considered a joint power plant construction pro-
ject between the city of Owensboro and Kentucky Utilities Company.
Without any discussion of the policy and law behind the holding, the
court quite simply noted that "the rule is well established that the
issuance of revenue bonds to finance a public project ... does not con-
stitute a lending of credit ....
In the Oregon case of Miles v. City of Eugene,68 the reasoning was
much more apparent. In Miles, local taxpayers and ratepayers
brought suit against the local utility challenging the agreement be-
tween the Eugene Water and Electric Board (EWEB) and other pri-
vate utilities to share expenses for a study of the construction and
operation of nuclear power facilities.69 The court rejected the consti-
tutional challenge, holding that the state's limitation "is not a restric-
tion upon the obtaining of funds by a municipality by the sale of
revenue bonds, as distinguished from general obligation bonds."70
Several factors contributed to this decision. First, the court observed
that while the EWEB was a department of the City of Eugene, the
Board "operates independently through an elected Board of Commis-
sioners .... City revenues cannot be used by EWEB and EWEB can-
not levy taxes."71 Thus, the debt of the EWEB could not pose a
general obligation to city taxpayers. Second, the court noted further
that there was an express disclaimer making this separation between
the utility and the city clear to the bondholders. The bonds specifi-
cally stated on their face that:
[Tihey do not in any manner constitute a general obligation of the Eugene
Water & Electric Board, or the City of Eugene, nor create a charge upon the
tax revenues of said city nor of any revenues or property of said city or prop-
erty of said Board but are payable solely from the general revenues of the
65. Id. at 335-36, 438 P.2d at 728.
66. See Miller v. City of Owensboro, 343 S.W.2d 398 (Ky. 1961); Miles v. City of Eu-
gene, 252 Or. 528, 451 P.2d 59 (1969).
67. Miller v. City of Owensboro, 343 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Ky. 1961).
68. 252 Or. 528, 451 P.2d 59 (1969).
69. Id. at 529, 451 P.2d at 60.
70. Id. at 531, 451 P.2d at 61.
71. Id. at 530, 451 P.2d at 60.
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electric utility system of the city .... 72
The bonds thus evidenced, on their face, the protections necessary to
sustain the policies of the constitutional restrictions on lending public
credit. The bond issue did not seek to finance the construction of pri-
vate facilities "with general obligation bonds payable from general tax
levies." 73
The question of whether the "credit" of the state is involved with
an energy conservation financing program can be answered by resort
to two separate inquiries. If the capital used in providing loans to cus-
tomers comes from general operating revenues, no credit is impli-
cated. Moreover, in most states, if the capital is derived from revenue
bonds that do not represent a levy on general tax revenues, there is no
grant of public "credit."
B. Does a Conservation Financing Program Involve the Credit "of the
State"?
Constitutional restrictions on the use of debt financing apply only
to state governments. 74 To the extent that obligations are undertaken
by the private sector, no constitutional prohibition exists. Moreover, a
split of authority exists as to whether debts incurred by political subdi-
visions are to be construed as extending the credit of the state.
1. The Private Sector
Revenue bonds that expressly disclaim the general liability of the
state for their repayment will not fall within the constitutional pro-
scription on lending public credit, even if issued by a state government
entity.75 In addition, to the extent that revenue bonds are backed by
securities that represent the collective security of private interests,
and not of the state, the credit of the state has not been given or
loaned.76
The Nebraska Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of what
constitutes the credit "of the state" in State ex rel. Douglas v. Ne-
braska Mortgage Finance Fund.77 In that proceeding, Nebraska's At-
torney General attacked the constitutionality of legislation that
sought to "assist private mortgage lenders in providing mortgage fi-
nancing for single family residences at reduced interest rates for low
72. Id. at 531-32, 451 P.2d at 61.
73. Id. at 537, 451 P.2d at 64.
74. But see infra notes 98-118 and accompanying text. The definition of "the state"
can extend to municipalities and other political subdivisions.
75. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 461-63, 283
N.W.2d 12, 23 (1979).
76. State ex rel. Meyer v. Duxbury, 183 Neb. 302, 307, 160 N.W.2d 88, 93 (1968).
77. 204 Neb. 445, 283 N.W.2d 12 (1979).
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and moderate income families .... "78 The legislation authorized the
Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund, a state government entity, to pur-
sue one program wherein the Fund would "make loans to mortgage
lenders which will use the proceeds to make mortgage loans" to indi-
viduals.79 The court held that "the principal function of the Fund is to
issue tax-free revenue bonds and to use the proceeds [inter alia] to
encourage lenders to make lower interest loans to low or moderate
income persons .... ,80 The court added that the state's bonds and
resulting loans to mortgage lenders were "solely for the purpose of
making mortgage loans to persons otherwise unqualified for mortgage
financing because of insufficient personal or family income."8 ' The
legislature stated expressly in the challenged Act that the Fund in-
volved "the creation of a government body."82 Thus no question ex-
isted but that it was "the state" acting through the form of the Fund in
making loans. The legislature also stated that the Fund involved
"public money provided by the sale of revenue bonds [that] may be
borrowed, expended, advanced, loaned or granted."83 Thus no ques-
tion existed but that "credit" was being extended to individuals. The
constitutional issue in the case was directly presented.
The Attorney General attacked the legislation as being in violation
of the constitutional proscription on lending the credit of the state.
However, the court rejected that argument and held:
If there is insufficient revenue with which to repay the bonds, the state in no
manner becomes obligated or liable. The Act specifically provides that the
bonds may not be a debt, liability or general obligation of the state, and must
contain on the face thereof a statement that neither the faith and credit nor
the taxing power of the state is pledged to the payment of the principal of or
the interest on such bonds.84
The court concluded that revenue bonds that specifically deny any lia-
bility of the state do not constitute state debt within the meaning of
the constitutional prohibition.85
In Mortgage Finance, the Nebraska Supreme Court specifically in-
dicated that bonds, the payment of which is limited to public utility
revenues,8 6 have "no state funds involved in the repayment of any
78. Id. at 447, 283 N.W.2d at 16.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 448, 283 N.W.2d at 16.
81. Id. at 447, 283 N.W.2d at 16.
82. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1605 (Supp. 1978).
83. Id.
84. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 461, 283
N.W.2d 12, 23 (1979).
85. Id. at 462, 283 N.W.2d at 23 (citations omitted).
86. This limit is particularly important for Nebraska, where all utilities are publicly-
owned. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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debt."87 The court had previously applied this reasoning in Carr v.
Feustermacher,8 8 to uphold utility financing of "the improvement on a
light plant."89 The Nebraska Court also favorably cited a Washington
state court decision "where the construction of a waterworks system
by a municipality was financed by obligations payable only from reve-
nue derived from the operation of the system."9 0
This Nebraska Supreme Court decision was a logical extension of
the reasoning first articulated by that court in a prior case concerning
pollution control bonds. In State ex rel. Meyer v. Duxbury, 91 the court
considered a challenge to the financing of the Nebraska Clean Waters
Commission. The commission was "authorized to issue bonds and
notes and to loan money to municipalities" 92 so as to further its pur-
poses of assisting "municipalities in the planning and financing of was-
tewater treatment works, wastewater collecting systems, and solid
waste disposal facilities."93
The challenge asserted a violation of the constitutional ban on
lending the credit of the state.94 The court rejected that argument on
two grounds. First, the court observed that there was a specific and
express disclaimer of any obligation on the part of the state,95 since
"[t]he act specifically provides that the bonds and notes issued by the
commission shall be general obligations of the commission, payable
solely from funds of the commission available for that purpose, and
not a liability of the state."96 The credit of the state cannot be held to
have been loaned in those situations when the state has indicated ex-
pressly that it will not be responsible for repayment. Second, the
court said that it was not the credit of the state that was relied upon in
the issuance of the bonds. Rather, the court found that:
The securities which may be pledged to secure the payment of the bonds and
notes to be issued by the commission are the bonds and notes of municipal
corporations. The bonds and notes issued by the commission actually repre-
sent the combined or collective credit of the municipal corporations which
have borrowed money from the commission.9 7
In essence, the court held that the bonds were issued using the credit
87. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 463, 283
N.W.2d 12, 23 (1979).
88. 119 Neb. 172, 228 N.W. 114 (1929).
89. Id.
90. State ex rel. Douglas v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 463, 283
N.W.2d 12, 23 (1979) (citing Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 41 P. 888 (1895)).
91. 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968).
92. Id. at 303, 160 N.W. 2d at 90.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 304, 160 N.W.2d at 91. The other constitutional challenges raised in this case
are not relevant to this discussion.
95. Id. at 307, 160 N.W.2d at 93.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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of the private entitites rather than the credit of the state. In such a
situation, constitutional proscriptions are not violated.
Not all debtor/creditor transactions in which the state is involved
necessarily implicate the credit of the state. In those situations in
which the evidence of indebtedness expressly disclaims any general
liability of the state, no public credit has been extended. Similarly, in
those situations in which the security relied upon is the security of the
private sector, no public credit is involved. In such circumstances, con-
stitutional limitations on lending the credit of the state do not apply.
2. Political Subdivisions
While the credit of political subdivisions is frequently considered to
be an item distinct from the credit of the state, this view is not unani-
mous.9 8 The Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the issue in State ex
rel. Beck v. City of York.99 The purpose of the constitutional provi-
sion, the court said, was to avoid intermingling public funds with pri-
vate enterprise.100 The results of such a ban were twofold. First, the
inability of a government to commit public funds to private sector ven-
tures worked to protect the public treasury.1 0 ' Tax dollars were not to
be risked in speculative undertakings.102 Second, the intermixing of
public and private funds undermined the free market system. 0 3 Com-
panies should not be required to compete with public sector capital.
Given these premises, the court said it would make little sense to
allow a state to avoid the intent of the prohibition by doing indirectly
what it was forbidden to do directly. 0 4 Municipalities, as well as other
political subdivisions, were mere instrumentalities of the state that
could be created and destroyed at the will of the state. 05 According to
the court:
[P]ublic monies may not be used for private purposes. To impose such a prohi-
bition as a matter of constitutional policy on the State, only to have its
beneficient purpose thwarted by a refinement of definition not contemplated
by its framers, would be to avoid the very purpose for which it was intended.
It is not the function of courts to thus rewrite constitutional provisions to
98. See Redevelopment Auth. of Madison v. Canepa, 7 Wis. 2d 643,652,97 N.W.2d 695,
699 (1959) (geographical subdivisions of state not limited by constitutional limit
on debt). See also Port Auth. of Saint Paul v. Fisher, 269 Minn. 276, 291, 132
N.W.2d 183, 194 (1964) (constitutional limit on lending credit not applicable to
minor subdivisions). Butsee Connor v. Herrick, 349 Mich. 201,216,84 N.W.2d 427,
430 (1957) (constitutional limit on lending credit applies with equal force to
municipalities).
99. 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
100. Id. at 225, 82 N.W.2d at 271.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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avoid their plain effect.1
0 6
The court said that to conclude that the state itself may not loan its
credit, but that it may create a separate entity to do so "would be, to
say the least, a very anomalous situation."107 It concluded that the
constitutional restriction "applies to the State and all political subdivi-
sions thereof."108
It is not so clear, however, that to exclude political subdivisions
from the coverage of constitutional limitations on lending public
credit would necessarily "rewite constitutional provisions to avoid
their plain effect."' 09 Many states expressly prohibit the extension of
credit by both the state and its political subdivisions.110 In Colorado,
for example, the state constitution provides that "neither the state,
nor any county, city, town, township or school district shall lend or
pledge the credit or faith thereof ..... ,111 Other states have a more
general prohibition against the extension of "state" or "public"
credit,112 thus leaving open a possible construction that the intent of
the provision was to apply only to the state and not to political subdivi-
sions.113 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in construing such a general
provision,114 reached precisely this latter conclusion. It held, without
explanation, that the provision "is a limitation on the state, not on
minor subdivisions."115 So, too, did the Wisconsin Supreme Court con-
strue a similar constitutional proscription. That court said that "it has
been held from almost the beginning that while the state is subject to
the prohibition limiting the power of the state to contract a debt...
geographical subdivisions are not so subject."116 These holdings are to
be contrasted with decisions that direct that "the express limitation on
the power of the state with reference to lending its credit ... applies
with equal force to municipalities of the state." 17
The authority on this question is, without a doubt, divided. The
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. IX, § 7; FLA. CONST. art VII, § 12; IND. CONST. art X,
§ 6; WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5.
111. COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
112. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; MASS. CONsT. art. LXII, § 1; OHIO CONsT. art.
VIII, § 4; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
113. This is not necessarily the construction that would follow from a general consti-
tutional provision. Nebraska is a good example of a state where a general provi-
sion has been given a narrow reading. Compare NEB. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 with
State ex reL Beck v. City of York, 164 Neb. 223, 82 N.W.2d 269 (1957).
114. Port Auth. of Saint Paul v. Fisher, 269 Minn. 276, 132 N.W.2d 183 (1964).
115. Id. at 291, 132 N.W.2d at 194.
116. Redevelopment Auth. of Madison v. Canepa, 7 Wis. 2d 643,652,97 N.W.2d 695, 699
(1959).
117. Connor v. Herrick, 349 Mich. 201, 216, 84 N.W.2d 427, 430 (1957).
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touchstone of the construction to be applied in any given state may
well be the specific language of the constitution. While some provi-
sions expressly make themselves applicable to political subdivisions,
others do not and, arguably, can be construed to have intentionally
excluded such expansive coverage."-8
3. Public Corporations
The credit of a public corporation is an item separate and distinct
from the credit of the state and thus does not implicate constitutional
prohibitions. The Nebraska Supreme Court, in State ex rel. Meyer v.
Duxbury,"9 raised this distinction almost in passing. Nevertheless,
the appropriate application of this principle could well be determina-
tive of any challenge to a utility financing program for conservation
measures. Duxbury involved a challege to the Nebraska Clean Waters
Commission. The court stated that "[i]t is important to note that the
commission is an agency of the state and not a separate corporation.
This results in the commission being subject to constitutional require-
ments and restrictions that would not be applicable to a separate cor-
poration."1 2 0 This distinction was also important to the Nebraska
Supreme Court in its consideration of State ex rel. Douglas v. Ne-
braska Mortgage Finance Fund.121 In Mortgage Finance the court
noted that the legislation under challenge "creates 'a body politic and
corporate, not a state agency, but an independent instrumentality ex-
ercising essential public functions, to be known as the Nebraska Mort-
gage Finance Fund.' "122 The court made much of this separate and
independent existence. The bonds of that Fund were held not to in-
voke the credit of the state because "only the Fund is involved. It is
the Fund which acquires the monies through the sale of bonds and it is
the Fund which repays the bonds through revenue which it
acquires." 2 3
This Nebraska treatment of public corporations is consistent with
other judicial precedent regarding public utilities. For example, Ala-
bama 2 4 and Georgia'2 5 have addressed the question directly, holding
that public utilities did not represent "subdivisions of the state" to
which constitutional restrictions applied. In Thompson v. Municipal
Electric Authority of Georgia,126 the Georgia Supreme Court consid-
ered a consortium of municipal governments joined together in an
118. See generally SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION § 47.24 (1972).
119. 183 Neb. 302, 160 N.W.2d 88 (1968).
120. Id. at 303, 160 N.W.2d at 91.
121. 204 Neb. 445, 283 N.W.2d 12 (1979).
122. Id. at 448, 283 N.W.2d at 16 (quoting NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1607 (1981)).
123. Id. at 461, 283 N.W.2d at 23.
124. Opinion of the Justices, 294 Ala. 571, 319 So. 2d 699 (1975).
125. Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth. of Ga., 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).
126. 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d 720 (1976).
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"Authority," the creation of which was permitted by state statute. 2 7
The court said quite simply that "the Authority is not a county, munic-
ipal corporation or political subdivision of this State."128 Similarly, in
Opinion of the Justices,129 the Alabama Supreme Court found that a
public corporation created for the generation and distribution of elec-
tricity 30 was not a subdivision of the state.131
4. Analysis
Both publicly-owned utilities and state governments can take very
definite steps to assure that energy conservation programs involving
utility financing are able to withstand constitutional scrutiny. An ex-
press disclaimer of state or municipal liability would seem appropriate
in the instance of a utility issuing revenue bonds.132 Instead, the
bonds would be secured by the credit of the public utility as a separate
and legal entity. A pledge of private security would also seem appro-
priate. 3 3 Bonds issued by a public utility are to generate funds to loan
to utility consumers. The securities pledged to secure payment of
those bonds can be the notes of the borrowers. The bonds and notes
issued by the utility thus would actually represent the collective credit
of the ratepayers who borrowed the money from the commission. 34
Each of these actions is possible at the discretion of the municipal util-
ity seeking to establish a conservation financing program.
Action by the state legislature could also enable public monies to
be committed to an energy conservation financing program. The legis-
lative creation of a state finance authority, as a separate public corpo-
ration, would not raise sustainable constitutional challenges.135 The
Nebraska legislature did precisely this in its creation of the Nebraska
Investment Finance Authority.136
The Nebraska Investment Finance Authority, the successor agency
127. Id. at 23, 231 S.E.2d at 725.
128. Id.
129. 294 Ala. 571, 319 So. 2d 699 (1975).
130. Id. at 575, 319 So. 2d at 703.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Walker v. Alaska State Mortgage Ass'n, 416 P.2d 245 (Alaska 1966);
Maine State Hous. Auth. v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699, 706 (Me. 1971);
Minnesota Hous. Fin. Auth. v. Hatfield, 297 Minn. 155, 163, 210 N.W.2d 298, 303
(1973); New Jersey Mortgage Fin. Agency v. McCrane, 56 N.J. 414, 423, 267 A.2d
24, 29 (1970); Martin v. North Carolina Hous. Corp., 277 N.C. 29, 53, 175 S.E.2d 665,
679 (1970).
133. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., State ex reL Meyer v. Duxbury 183 Neb. 302, 307, 160 N.W.2d 88, 93.
135. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text (discussing this principle as applied
to public utility companies). See also cases cited supra note 132 (applying the
principle to other types of public corporations).
136. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 58-201-72 (Supp. 1983).
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to the Nebraska Mortgage Finance Fund,137 is legislatively authorized
to pursue numerous activities. Among these are:
(1) To borrow money and issue bonds as provided by the Nebraska Invest-
ment Finance Authority Act;
13 8
(2) To issue bonds for the purpose of paying the cost of financing any project
or projects, and to secure the payment of such bonds as provided in the
Nebraska Investment Finance Authority Act;1 3 9 [and]
(3) To enter into financing agreements with others with respect to one or
more projects to provide financing for such projects upon such terms and
conditions as the authority may deem advisable to effectuate the public
purposes of the Nebraska Investment Finance Authority Act .... 140
The state legislature expressly included the financing of energy con-
servation projects within the Nebraska Investment Finance Authority
Act.141 In that statute, the legislature set forth extensive findings re-
garding why such public financing of conservation projects constituted
and furthered a public purpose.142 In addressing the "energy
problems" facing the state of Nebraska, the legislature found:
(1) Adequate and reliable energy supplies are a basic necessity of life and
sufficient energy supplies are essential to supplying adequate food and
shelter,
(2) The cost and availability of energy supplies has been and will continue to
be a matter of state and national concern;
(3) The increasing cost and decreasing availability of energy supplies for pur-
poses of residential heating will limit the ability of many of Nebraska's
citizens to provide the basic necessities of life and will result in a deterio-
137. There has not been a constitutional challenge to the powers of the Nebraska In-
vestment Finance Authority. The fact that it is the successor agency to the Ne-
braska Mortgage Finance Fund, however, is significant. In State ex reL Douglas
v. Nebraska Mortgage Fin. Fund, 204 Neb. 445, 283 N.W.2d 12 (1979), the powers
of that Fund were upheld. It would necessarily follow that the powers of the
Investment Fund would also be sustained. See also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 58-204 to
205 (Supp. 1983).
138. NEB. REV. STAT. § 58-239(9) (Supp. 1983).
139. NEB. REV. STAT. § 58-239(18) (Supp. 1983).
140. NEB. REV. STAT. § 58-239(22) (Supp. 1983).
141. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 66-1001 to 1011 (1981).
142. NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-1001 (1981). These findings include&
(1) Our present dependence on foreign oil has created a danger to the
public health and welfare and a need for a dependable source of
energy;
(2) Conservation is one of the most prudent means of meeting our need
for a dependable source of energy;
(3) There is an urgent and continuing need for every person and busi-
ness in the state to conserve energy,
(4) There is an urgent and continuing need for capital to provide the
initial investment necessary to make homes and other buildings
more energy efficient;
(5) It would be prudent for our publicly-owned electric utilities to sup-
ply this needed capital in order to avoid the greater costs of con-
structing new generation facilities; and
(6) Involvement by our publicly-owned electric utilities in energy con-
servation programs serves a public purpose.
208 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:189
ration in living conditions and a threat to the health and welfare of the
citizens of this state;
(4) Energy conservation through building modifications including, but not
limited to, insulation, weatherization, and the installation of alternative
energy devices has been shown to be a prudent means of reducing energy
consumption costs and the need for additional costly facilities to produce
and supply energy;
(5) Because of the high cost of available capital, the purchase of energy con-
servation devices is not possible for many Nebraskans. The prohibitively
high interest rates for private capital create a situation in which the nec-
essary capital cannot be obtained solely from private enterprise sources
and there is a need for the stimulation of investment of private capital,
thereby encouraging the purchase of energy conservation devices and en-
ergy conserving building modifications;
(6) The increased cost per capita of supplying adequate life sustaining energy
needs has reduced the amount of funds, both public and private, available
for providing other necessities of life, including food, health care, and
safe, sanitary housing;, and
(7) The continuing purchase of energy supplies results in the transfer of ever
increasing amounts of capital to out-of-state energy suppliers.' 4 3
The legislature concluded that the Finance Authority was necessary
because those problems "cannot alone be remedied through the opera-
tion of private enterprise or individual communities or both, but may
be alleviated through the creation of a quasi-governmental body" to,
among other things, "encourage the investment of private capital."144
Having made these findings, Nebraska's public utilities145 were
statutorily authorized 1 46 to make loans to owners of residential, agri-
cultural, or commercial buildings "solely for the purchase or installa-
tion of energy conservation measures."147 The legislature determined
that these conservation loans included "an extension of credit by a
utility from its own capital or from capital raised by the Nebraska In-
vestment Finance Authority .. ."148
143. NEB. REv. STAT. § 58-202(3) (Supp. 1983).
144. NEB. REV. STAT. § 58-203(1) (Supp. 1983).
145. "Utility shall mean a publicly-owned electrical utility providing either wholesale
or retail service within the state." NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-1006 (1981).
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-1007 (1981).
147. These measures were defined by statute. NEB. REv. STAT. § 66-1004 (1981). The
measures included:
(1) Caulking or weatherstripping of doors or windows;
(2) Furnace efficiency modifications involving electric service;
(3) Clock thermostats;
(4) Water heater insultation of modification;
(5) Ceiling, attic, wall or floor insulation;
(6) Storm windows or doors, multiglazed windows or doors, or heat ab-
sorbing or reflecting glazed window and door material;
(7) Devices which control demand of appliances and aid load manage-
ment; and
(8) Such other conservation measures as the State Energy Office shall
identify.
Id.
148. NEB. REV. STAT. § 66-1005 (Supp. 1983).
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Two possible mechanisms thus exist to allow the commitment of
public funds for an energy conservation financing program. Publicly-
owned utilities themselves have the means available to structure such
a program. In addition, state legislative action can be taken to create a
public financing program for conservation measures. In either case,
no constitutional problems arise regarding lending the credit of the
state.
C. Does a Conservation Financing Program Involve a Gift or Loan of
Credit?
Utility conservation financing programs that involve an exchange
of mutual consideration entail no loan or gift of credit of the state as
contemplated by the constitutional provisions that proscribe such ac-
tions. The Nebraska Supreme Court directly faced this issue in Blue
lame Gas Association v. McCook Public Power District.149 In that
case, the court considered a constitutional challenge to a demand pro-
motion program that McCook public power district had developed.
The court explained the program:
In the late spring of 1969, the defendant by advertisements offered to install a
complete electric heating system in any home in its service area free upon the
agreement of the customer to heat his home electrically for 5 calendar years.
The equipment became the property of the customer after he had used it for
the required 5 years, but if he failed to fulfill the agreement, the district had
the right to remove the equipment.1 5 0
The public power district offered this program to stimulate electricity
sales during the winter, McCook's off-peak season.151 McCook was a
purchaser of wholesale power from the Nebraska Public Power Dis-
trict and its purchase contract contained a ratchet clause,152 that is,
one that works as a type of "take-or-pay" contract requiring payment
for at least 70 percent of the amount of electric energy used in its peak
demand month whether used or not. 53 The court observed, "[i]n the
winter months particularly, the defendant was required to pay for
149. 186 Neb. 735, 186 N.W.2d 498 (1971).
150. Id. at 736, 186 N.W.2d at 499.
151. "Peak" demand is the "maximum actual or expected load for some period of
time." W. MARsH, ECONOMICS OF ELECTRIC UTLIT PowER GENERATION 181
(1980).
152. The rachet clause provides in substance that when the amount of electri-
cal energy actually supplied by CEI exceeds the amount called for by the
letter agreement, the contract demand will thereupon increase by the
amount of the excess. The practical effect of this provision is that each
time consumption of energy above that specified in the agreement rises
to a new level, the demand charge is elevated to that new level and is
never reduced, even if actual demand thereafter declines substantially.
City of Cleveland v. Federal Power Comm'n, 525 F.2d 845, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Cf. City of Cleveland v. Federal Power Comm'n, 561 F.2d 344,345 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
153. Blue Flame Gas Ass'n v. McCook Pub. Power Dist., 186 Neb. 735,736,186 N.W.2d
498, 499 (1971).
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wholesale energy for which it did not have a retail demand."154
The court rejected, as "untenable on the facts,"15 5 a claim that this
program involved a loan or gift of the credit of the state to an individ-
ual. The rationale of the court is clear and consistent with other state
appellate courts that have addressed similar issues.15 6 In this situation
the retail utility neither loaned nor gave anything at all. Rather, a
binding contract with mutual covenants, consented to by each party,
had been created. In exchange for an agreement to use off-peak elec-
tric heating, the utility provided to the customer the equipment neces-
sary to make the conversion. Each party to the contract benefitted.
The utility was able to successfully market its purchased, but hereto-
fore unnecessary, off-peak power. The customer obtained the electric
heating implements at no out-of-pocket cost.
The issue raised by the constitutional prohibition on lending the
credit of the state was articulated well by the Washington Supreme
Court in Public Utility District v. Taxpayers and Ratepayers of Sno-
homish County.157 In that proceeding, a consortium of Washington
municipalities agreed to take a 28 percent ownership share in a coal-
fired power plant, with four private power companies holding the re-
maining 72 percent.15s The cities agreed to sell to the federal govern-
ment their share of that power for the first twelve years.1 59 Still, the
court found no unconstitutional lending of credit:
[A]ppellants argue that the financial participation of these public corporations
in the project is 'in aid of' private corporations, for it enables the private own-
ers to obtain additional financing, otherwise unavailable. However, even if the
private owners are 'aided' by the respondents' participation, the issue is
whether the aid comes in the form of gifts or loans of money or credit.1 6 0
The court concluded that "there is no gift or loan of money or credit
before us." 161 It found that the utilities "in return for their invest-
ment . . . receive ownership interests commensurate to the size of
their investments."162
The Washington Supreme Court also considered the issue in a pro-
ceeding that involved transactions similar to those in the McCook case.
The court, in Washington Natural Gas Company v. Public Utility Dis-
154. Id.
155. Id. at 739, 186 N.W.2d at 501.
156. See, e.g., Cremer v. Peoria Hous. Auth., 399 Ill. 2d 579, 593-94, 78 N.E.2d 276, 284
(1948). See also Thompson v. Municipal Elec. Auth. of Ga, 238 Ga. 19, 231 S.E.2d
720 (1976); State ex TeL Mitchell v. City of Sikeston, 555 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. 1977);
Public Util. Dist. v. Taxpayers & Ratepayers of Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d
724, 479 P.2d 61 (1971); Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977).
157. 78 Wash. 2d 724, 479 P.2d 61 (1971).
158. Id. at 725-26, 479 P.2d at 62.
159. Id. at 730, 479 P.2d at 65.
160. Id. at 727, 479 P.2d at 63.
161. Id.
162. Id.
[Vol. 64:189
1985] MUNICIPAL UTILITY FINANCING 211
trict No. 1 of Shohomish County, 6 3 upheld the principle that in the
event that mutual considerations are exchanged, no loan or gift of the
credit of the state is involved in a transaction. In Washington Natural
Gas, a natural gas distributor sought to restrain a county public utility
district from offering inducements to encourage land developers to in-
stall underground electrical distribution systems. The utility district
sought further to persuade homeowners in new housing developments
to buy electrical energy and service.164
The inducements were contained within a contract offered by the
utility district to the land developer whereby the utility offered to in-
stall, at its own initial expense, a complete underground electric distri-
bution system and an ornamental street lighting system.165 In turn,
the developer agreed to pay $225 per lot to the utility within three
years of the date of the agreement, with interest at 6 percent on the
unpaid balance.166 If, however, the developer erected a "total electric
dwelling" within that three year period, the utility agreed to provide a
$150 credit or payment to the $225 contractual amount. 6 7 The gas
company challenged this promotional scheme, asserting that it in-
volved unconstitutional gifts and an improper granting of public
credit.
The Washington court rejected that challenge. In so doing, it
looked to see whether there was, in fact, "a beneficial contract" with
"genuine mutuality."168 The court found that:
[N]ot only is there an abundance of consideration moving directly to the PUD
in the instant case to support its offer of a contract, but there will be an actual
delivery of property and acquisition of ownership by the PUD in addition to
the sale of electricity which will be made under the contract. 1 6 9
The utility, the court said, stood to gain "measurable benefits" from
the contractual arrangement.170 It would, among other things, "ac-
quire a substantial number of total electric customers who will
purchase from it greater amounts of electrical energy than ordinary
customers." 171 As a result, the court concluded, "there is. . . no lend-
ing of money or credit. . . but rather a genuine exchange of concrete,
specific measurable consideration."172
The reasoning of these cases is well-adapted to the contemporary
163. 77 Wash. 2d 94, 459 P.2d 633 (1969).
164. Id. at 100, 459 P.2d at 636-37.
165. Id. at 99-100, 459 P.2d at 636-37.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 102, 459 P.2d at 638.
169. Id. at 103, 459 P.2d at 638.
170. Id. at 103, 459 P.2d at 638-39.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 103-04, 459 P.2d at 639.
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energy situation as well. The Washington case was decided in 1969,173
the Nebraska case in 1971.174 During this era, electricity was a cheap
source of energy and, by increasing demand, a utility could pass on to
all of its customers the benefits gained through economies of scale in
power generation.175 That situation has changed dramatically.
Higher construction costs, higher capital costs, and higher environ-
mental costs have all contributed to drive the price of new capacity
additions substantially upward.176 Moreover, state and federal policy-
makers are recognizing the need to conserve fossil fuels, including nat-
ural gas, oil, and coal.17 7 The United States Supreme Court held
recently that "[w]e accept without reservation the argument that con-
servation, as well as the development of alternate energy sources, is an
imperative national goal. Administrative bodies empowered to regu-
late electric utilities have the authority-and indeed the duty-to take
appropriate action to further this goal."178 Similarly, the Nebraska
legislature has found that "adequate and reliable energy supplies are a
basic necessity of life," and that "the cost and availability of energy
supplies has been and will continue to be a matter of state and na-
tional concern." 179 The legislature concluded that "energy conserva-
tion ... has been shown to be a prudent means of reducing energy
consumption costs and the need for additional costly facilities to pro-
duce and supply energy." 8 0
Today, therefore, the recognized need of the prudent utility is to
decrease, not to increase, demand for electricity. To the extent that a
utility can purchase the decreased demand through the implementa-
tion of conservation technologies by its customers, the company re-
ceives a "genuine exchange of concrete, specific measurable
consideration" as it did when the need was otherwise nearly two de-
cades ago.181 In such a situation, the provision of utility financing for
173. Id. at 94, 459 P.2d at 633.
174. Blue Flame Gas Ass'n v. McCook Pub. Power Dist., 186 Neb. 735, 186 N.W.2d 498
(1971).
175. C. KOMANOFF, supra note 2, at 14-44.
176. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
178. Central Hudson Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 571 (1980).
179. NEB. REV. STAT. § 58-202(3) (Supp. 1983).
180. Id.
181. Cf Re Detroit Edison Co., No. U-6871 (Mich. P.S.C. June 29, 1982). See also Re
Michigan Consol. Gas Co. 1 PUB. UTIL. REP. (PUR) 229, 234 (Mich. P.S.C. Oct. 5,
1973).
Language in the Washington Supreme Court case, however, raises the issue of
whether there is an adequate consideration to avoid constitutional constraints in
the context of "buying" energy conservation in the event that the utility provided
subsidized, i.e., lower than market cost, interest rates. In Washington Natural
Gas Co. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County, 77 Wash. 2d 94, 459 P.2d
633 (1969), the court spoke of the constitution prohibiting, as a lending of the
state's credit, the provision of "short term credit" that allowed "the customer to
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the installation of such conservation measures, like the Nebraska and
Washington programs discussed above, would not invoke the constitu-
tional proscription of making a loan or a gift of the state's credit.
IV. Conclusion
Recent dramatic increases in electric utility rates have given rise to
concern about the continuing efficacy of a sole reliance upon the pro-
vision of energy services through traditional means. With various fac-
tors driving the cost of new central station generation progressively
higher, increased electric demands that lead to the need for new
power plant construction virtually assure further increases in future
electric rates.
One alternative to this scenario, which has been proferred in the
past, has been to transform the utility industry into providers of full
energy services. As such, those companies would, in addition to pro-
viding traditional energy from fuels such as oil, natural gas, and coal,
offer the "energy services" of conservation as well as load manage-
ment and renewable resource devices. The utility industry, however,
has vigorously opposed regulatory efforts attempting to move the in-
dustry in this direction. One recurring focal point of confrontation has
been whether state regulators have the authority to compel utility
companies, against their will, to provide financing for alternative en-
ergy services.
Recently, however, utility analysts have begun to recognize the
benefits to the industry that inhere in the move toward energy conser-
vation and other demand-side alternatives. Increased capital flexibil-
ity and increased financial security to the industry are welcome
prospects in a time of high interest rates, uncertain demand, and
multi-billion dollar construction costs. Yet even while the industry
develops a newly found enthusiasm for promoting nontraditional en-
ergy strategies, including incorporating the use of utility financing
convert this concession into a profitable hypothecation of credit with third per-
sons." Id. at 104, 459 P.2d at 639. However, this potential problem should provide
no barrier to interest rate reductions in financing programs offered by publicly-
owned utilities. The question of whether a reduced interest rate would, in itself,
constitute "lending the credit of the state" in violation of constitutional restric-
tions should be answered by application of the analysis offered throughout this
Article. In addition, utilities on the local level, or state legislatures, could make
findings such as those made by the Nebraska legislature. That assembly found
"[b]ecause of the high cost of available capital, the purchase of energy conserva-
tion devices is not possible for many Nebraskans. The prohibitively high interest
rates for private capital create a situation in which the necessary capital cannot
be obtained solely from private enterprise sources .... NEB. REV. STAT. § 58-
202(3)(e) (Supp. 1983).
For other discussions of how "conservation subsidies" such as reduced interest
rates are consistent with accepted ratemaking principles, see Schroeder & Miller,
supra note 7, at 1027-29.
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programs, concerns have arisen over the ability of publicly-owned util-
ities, such as municipal utilities, to provide such programs.
Most states have constitutional provisions restricting the loaning of
the credit of the state to private interests. In at least two states, legal
opinions have been rendered indicating that these constitutional re-
strictions proscribe having publicly-owned utility companies imple-
ment conservation financing programs for their customers. Under
this analysis, even a willing utility would be barred from making such
financing available.
This Article has examined that conclusion in detail and found that
the constitutional provisions in question provide no such bar. The his-
torical purpose of the constitutional limit was to prevent state govern-
ments from providing venture capital to new industry such as frontier
railroads. The provision of energy conservation financing implicates
no such policy. Moreover, in order for the constitutional provisions to
be applicable, three elements must first be demonstrated. First, there
must be "credit" involved; second, the credit must be that "of the
state"; and third, the credit must be given or loaned. All of those ele-
ments have been examined as they regard an energy conservation loan
program, and, each has been found to be wanting.
A state constitutional provision restricting the loan of the credit of
the state provides no barrier to the offer of an energy conservation
financing program by a publicly-owned utility.
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